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Turning Red Rural Landscapes Yellow? Suﬃ  ciency Economy and Royal 
Projects in the Hills of Nan Province, Northern Thailand
Amalia Rossi1
 Citation  Rossi, A. (2012). Turning Red Rural Landscapes Yellow? Sufficiency Economy and Royal Projects in the Hills 
of Nan Province, Northern Thailand. ASEAS - Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 5(2), 275-291.
This paper discusses the eff orts of the royal family to moralise the environmental behaviour of their 
subjects in the name of the Suﬃ  ciency Economy philosophy solicited by King Bhumibol since the 
1990s in Thailand. Drawing on ethnographic ﬁ eldwork conducted in Nan province, Northern Thai-
land, in 2008 and 2009, I focus particularly on Royal Projects recently promoted to correct the rural 
practices of the ethnic minority groups living in the hills of Nan. In the past, many of these ethnic 
groups took part in the Maoist insurgency while at present, they represent a key basin of support-
ers for the reformist Red Shirts movement which is currently threatening the role of the monarchy 
in Thai politics. The research suggests that the recently increased trend of staging new projects for 
sustainable agro-forestry management in a ‘red’ area as Nan does not only aim at improving the 
conditions of mountain peoples and of the environment, but simultaneously increases the political 
infl uence of the conservative forces over this ‘ungovernable’ territory in times of political crisis.
Keywords: Lua People; Northern Thailand; Royal Projects; Suffi  ciency Economy; Thai Politics
Dieser Artikel diskutiert die Bemühungen der königlichen Familie in Thailand seit den 1990-er Jah-
ren, das Umweltverhalten ihrer Subjekte im Namen der Suﬃ  ciency Economy Philosophie von König 
Bhumibol zu moralisieren. Mit Bezug auf ethnograﬁ sche Forschung in der Provinz Nan in Nord-
thailand in den Jahren 2008 und 2009 fokussiere ich insbesondere auf Royal Projects, die in letzter 
Zeit gefördert werden, um ländliche Praktiken ethnischer Minderheiten in den Bergen von Nan zu 
korrigieren. In der Vergangenheit waren viele dieser ethnischen Gruppen am maoistischen Aufstand 
beteiligt, während sie heute ein zentrales Auff angbecken für UnterstützerInnen der reformistischen 
Rothemden, die derzeit die Rolle der Monarchie in der thailändischen Politik in Frage stellen, darstel-
len. Die Forschung deutet an, dass der Trend zur Einführung von neuen Projekten für nachhaltigen 
Feldwaldbau in einem „roten“ Gebiet wie Nan nicht nur die Bedingungen von Bergvölkern und ihrer 
Umwelt verbessern will, sondern gleichzeitig den politischen Einfl uss von konservativen Kräften über 
„unregierbare“ Gebiete in Zeiten politischer Krisen erhöht. 
Schlagworte: Lua; Nordthailand; Royal Projects; Suffi  ciency Economy; Thailändische Politik
1   Amalia Rossi got her PhD in Anthropology in 2012 at the Department of Human Science of the University of 
Milan -Bicocca, Italy. She has conducted fieldwork in Northern Thailand, mainly on public representations of 
nature and on socio-environmental movements. The author would like to thank two anonymous reviewers 
and Oliver Pye for their contribution to the improvement of the paper and their support for editing the text. 
Contact: amalia.rossi79@gmail.com
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Introduction
Since the 1950s, King Bhumibol Adulyadej (Rama IX) and other members of the royal 
family have funded a large number of rural development projects called Royal Pro-
jects. In Northern Thailand, the first projects targeted ethnic minorities living in the 
upland areas (the so-called ‘mountain people’ chao khao) and promoted programmes 
for opium eradication and substitution and health, educational, and infrastructural 
facilities. These projects can be seen in the context of counter-insurgency activities 
in the mountainous regions of Northern Thailand. Rural development was designed 
to isolate the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) and to integrate the ethnic minori-
ties into the nation state. In some ways, this strategy was successful, and the CPT 
gave up its armed struggle in 1982. Ex-fighters were granted amnesty and tentatively 
assimilated back into mainstream Thai society.
However, over the last decade, Thailand has seen a new political polarisation be-
tween the conservative Yellow Shirts movement and the reformist Red Shirts move-
ment. The so-called Yellow Shirts movement (yellow being both the colour of the 
monarchy and of Buddhism in the national imaginary) is a nationalist movement that 
seeks to restore and consolidate the power of the conservative forces (the monarchy, 
state bureaucracy – often headed by aristocrats – and the army). It rose in opposi-
tion to the figure of the reformist businessman and politician Thaksin Shinawatra 
and to his party, the Thai Rak Thai (TRT), the winner of national political elections in 
2001 and 2005 (Phongpaichit & Baker, 2008). The Yellow Shirts accused Thaksin of un-
dermining the King, which was one justification for the coup d’état by the army that 
ousted Thaksin in 2006 (Connors, 2008; Ungpakorn, 2007). 
In the years leading up to and after the coup d’état, a new spate of Royal Projects 
has been initiated in the region. Ostensibly, the main focus has changed from irriga-
tion and rural development to the promotion of sustainable agriculture, the manage-
ment of natural resources, and the protection of local biodiversity (Supaporn, 2008), 
referring to King Bhumibol’s philosophy of Sufficiency Economy as their ideological 
framework and inspiration. 
This article is based on ethnographic research of these new Royal Projects in the 
northern province of Nan.2 It argues that the new spate of Royal Projects represents 
2   I conducted fieldwork in this area from December 2007 to November 2009. The research was conducted within 
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an attempt by the conservative elite to counter the influence of the ousted Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and the Red Shirts movement in Nan. The projects and 
the class differences between the project developers and those to be developed high-
light the social and cultural gulf between the royalist Yellow Shirts and Thaksin-
supporting Red Shirts in contemporary Thailand. 
The past and present political background of the province invites to map connec-
tions between two current parallel trends: the strongly publicised royal interest in 
sustainable natural resource management of the Nan river basin and the ‘yellow’ 
imperative to consolidate the presence of conservative forces in politically sensitive 
(‘red’) areas. I will evoke some elements of the cultural and political impact of Royal 
Projects in Nan, keeping in mind that in this area development projects have often 
had political and military vested interests. Therefore, I first analyse the localisation 
of Royal Projects in Nan in the name of the King’s Sufficiency Economy philosophy 
that has been reshaping the expressive horizon of those non-farmers (NGO workers, 
bureaucrats, civil servants) since 2000. Then, I briefly describe the social environ-
ment shared by upland and lowland farmers and the tendential response of these 
socio-economic groups to Sufficiency Economy and to alternative development de-
vices triggered by NGOs, Royal Projects, and the state. Finally, I discuss the social and 
political impact of two Royal Projects recently implemented in Nan.
From Red to Red. The Politicisation of Rural Development in Nan Province 
Nan province, in the most eastern part of Northern Thailand and at the border with 
Laos, is a sparsely populated part of the country. Only about 500,000 people live in 
the valley along the Nan river and in the mountain ranges on both sides of the river. 
This geography is reflected in the ethnic make-up. Those living in the valley call 
themselves khon muang (literally ‘people of the city’) and tend to consider themselves 
as descending from the ethnic T’ai colonisers. The lowlanders call the mountain-
dwellers a generic chao khao (‘mountain people’ – but also ‘the others’, see Forsyth 
the PhD programme in Anthropology of the University of Milan-Bicocca, Italy. The article draws partly on my PhD 
dissertation (Rossi, 2012). The data presented here result from a multi-sided ethnographic approach, entailing the 
intermittent frequenting and the participant observation of about a dozen different key locations in the north-
eastern districts of Nan province. The reported interviews have been selected among more than a hundred open and 
semi-structured interviews to subjects directly involved in agro-forestry development activities (mainly farmers, 
NGO leaders, conservationist monks, public officers, and managers of royal development projects). 
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& Walker, 2008, p. 59), although they are made up of various different ethnic or lan-
guage groups such as the Mon-Khmer speaking minorities Lua, Htin, Khamu, Mlabri, 
and the Hmong and Mien groups (Davis, 1984; Delcore, 2008; Rossi, 2012).
The mountainous terrain, the social and political marginality, and the ethnic di-
versity of upland Nan province was conducive to armed guerrilla warfare, and Nan 
became a stronghold of the CPT during the 1970s. “Most of the province [was] CPT 
controlled” (De Beer, 1978, p. 147) in the mid-1970s, and the Maoist Peoples Liberation 
Army of Thailand (PLAT) established ‘liberated red villages’ in the mountains. Many 
ethnic groups like Hmong, Mien, and Lua took part in the Maoist army to gain au-
tonomy from the central powers. The recruitment strategies of the PLAT were based 
on ethnic criteria: the Hmong were the first to join the guerrilla, while Lua – the 
largest minority in Nan province – and groups of T’ai khon muang (both Yuan and T’ai 
Lue, the dominant ethnic groups in the region living by the valley plains), followed 
(Sathyawadhna, 1991). Members of the student movement from Chiang Mai, Bangkok, 
and other cities found political and material support from chao khao groups when 
hundreds of them decided to join the guerrilla in the jungle after the military repres-
sion of the democratic triennium (1973-1976) (Morell & Samudavanija, 1981; Wyatt, 
1982/2003).
The counter-insurgency strategy of the army included bombing ‘red’ villages or 
forcibly evacuating and resettling their inhabitants (De Beer, 1978, p. 147). This was 
flanked by rural development programmes that were basically driven by security issues 
and not by social and environmental ones. At that time, the promotion of agricultural 
and infrastructural modernisation in Thailand was one of the main tools by which the 
government, intermittently represented by army generals loyal to the Crown, tried 
to contain the spread of communism. Accelerated Rural Development (ARD), combin-
ing agricultural extension and infrastructural projects, was promoted to relieve the 
economic condition of the rural working classes and to prevent T’ai and chao khao 
farmers from joining the guerrilla forces (Charoensin-O-Larn, 1988, pp. 203-232). This 
especially happened in ‘red’ liberated areas such as Nan, where ARD programmes, 
conceived under the guidance of the US intelligence, were implemented by the army 
in areas where communist ‘terrorists’ were believed to operate (Marks, 2007).
In this context, Royal Projects can be seen as part of a consolidated state strat-
egy to contain the economic discontent among farmers (both chao khao and khon 
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muang), who have been chronically disappointed by incomplete, awkward, and lowly 
publicised land reforms that systematically left the majority without property rights 
on the land (Kemp, 1971; Leonard & Na Ayutthaya, 2005). In the 1970s, Royal Projects 
mainly consisted of irrigation, weir and dam-building projects, and of crop conver-
sion projects that were supposed to eradicate poppy cultivation. Perhaps most spec-
tacular was the Queen Sirikit dam on the Nan river – a symbol of national develop-
ment that was completed in 1972. Other small Royal Projects were promoted during 
the guerrilla in the western part of the province (being the eastern part of the Nan 
basin in turmoil). These projects that included the construction of schools, roads, 
and water management facilities had been implemented since the 1960s, and their 
number increased especially in the late 1970s, when the terrorist guerrilla seemed to 
become a revolution (The Office of His Majesty’s Principle Private Secretary, 1982).
According to a recent book, the official definition of a Royal Project is
a group of organizations joined by the common purpose of realizing the King’s vision for the Thai high-
lands. In this scene the Royal Project is an informal network of numerous organizations both national 
and international. The first and most important group involved in the Royal Project is the hill-tribe farm-
ers themselves. Not only are they the beneficiaries of the work done by the project, but they are also the 
ones who actually do the most of the work. (Wichai, PhunthiSung, & Luang, 2007, p. 55)
In Nan, the ‘hill-tribes’, mainly represented by Mon-Khmer speaking minorities such 
as the Lua, were a particular target of the Royal Projects. Following the “strategy 
of peace” enacted to stop the insurgence (Law 66/23 of 1980), captured and surren-
dered Maoist comrades were formally defined as ‘co-operators for the development 
of the nation’ (Pu Ruam Patthana Chat Thai, known as PhoRoTho). The memory of 
the recent past, thus, still operates through this network of guerrilla veterans: The 
PhoRoTho initiatives (conferences, workshops, seasonal camps) provide an important 
identity marker for many Lua (but also Hmong, Mien, and khon muang) individuals 
and families that live on the hills of Nan province today. The network, indeed, led to 
the establishment of solidarity relations among former comrades and among their 
descendents all over Thailand. 
The amnesty for communist insurgents and the defeat of the CPT can be seen as a 
victory of the Thai military and monarchy over the first ‘red’ areas. However, in the 
1980s and 1990s, old problems continued, and new conflicts over land and forest re-
sources emerged. After logging in Nan had been encouraged by the army to prevent 
the spread of the guerrillas in the forest (an experience relayed to me in many inter-
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views with conservationist monks and lay activists in the province), the logging ban 
issued in 1989 (Lakanavichian, 2001) and new national parks created a conservation 
legislation that was primarily targeted against farmers and ‘hill-tribes’ (Pye, 2005).
In Santisuk district, for example, near the Doi Phu Kha National Park, many farmers 
were encouraged to cultivate genetically modified maize on the forested hills under 
the contract farming regime promoted by the converging interests of state ministries 
and large agro-business corporations such as Charoen Pokhpand (CP). These farmers 
often fell in a spiral of debt, and their families were impoverished by this system. 
They were not the legal owners of the land they farmed, and they had to pay their 
debts with local entrepreneurs and with the Bank of Agriculture, which seasonally 
provided the chemical stocks of fertilisers and pesticides and genetically modified 
seeds for maize farming. To repay their debts, farmers encroached into forest areas 
to establish new cultivations and came into conflict with the park authorities. This 
situation is common all over Northern Thailand, particularly for the chao khao of this 
and other provinces (Rossi, 2012).
Poverty, landlessness, and negative experiences with government agencies such 
as the Royal Forest Department were all reasons for the popularity of Thaksin Shi-
nawatra, who offered different kinds of development possibilities with programmes 
such as debt moratoriums, micro-credit for rural investment (the one-million-baht-
programme), and the 30-baht universal health care scheme (Phongpaichit & Baker, 
2009). During my fieldwork I could experience the widespread appreciation for the 
Red Shirts and for the ousted ex-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. 
In the eastern area of the upper Nan river basin (Santisuk, Pua, Bo Kluea, and 
Chaolerm Phrakiert districts), many farmers declared to me to feel largely satisfied 
with the social and economic policies promoted under the government of Thaksin. 
Due to the widespread discontent of the rural population and the hope (sustained 
by Thaksin) to take part in a wider society of consumption, during the decade 2000-
2010, in Nan, a general sympathy for the Red Shirts movement among a wide range 
of socio-economic profiles (farmers, urban and rural workers, both chao khao and 
khon muang, small and large entrepreneurs, students) was tangible and has in many 
ways replaced the widespread support for the CPT. A crucial factor (reported to me 
by key activists of the Hug Muang Nan Foundation and by local leaders) is that the CPT 
veteran network PhoRoTho, which is particularly popular in Northern and North-
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Eastern Thailand, counts many supporters of the radical wing of the Red Shirts move-
ment today. Among the dozens of rural workers I interviewed (both khon muang and 
Lua, men and women) somebody even argued continuity between Thaksin’s welfare 
policies and the communist aspiration of egalitarian distribution of wealth among 
different classes. The Royal Projects and counter-insurgency rural development could 
not prevent this turn, full circle, “from red to red” (Kitiarsa, 2012).
Sufficiency Economy and the New Royal Projects in Nan
In 1997, the year the financial crisis hit the Thai economy and the urban and rural 
working classes, King Bhumibol announced his concern for the development model 
embraced by Thailand and spoke out for a radical change. In a now famous speech, 
he emphasised the necessity for what he called a Sufficiency Economy (settakit po pi-
ang in Thai). In his opinion, Thai individuals, families, and communities should focus 
on the satisfaction of their basic needs through their own production and consump-
tion of local natural resources. Moderation and reasonability should drive the Thai 
people’s economic choices before possibly, and not necessarily, engaging in risky in-
vestments in the globalised market economy (Grossman & Faulder, 2012, pp. 265-279).
The Sufficiency Economy model was immediately taken up by government agencies 
but lost real influence under the successful economic policies of the Thaksin government 
that stressed mildly Keynesian investment strategies as a way out of the crisis. However, 
after the coup d’état, Sufficiency Economy resurfaced as the main ideological flagship 
of the conservative forces. In 2007, it was included in the new constitution as a funda-
mental guideline in economic, social, and environmental policies and in open opposition 
to Thaksin reformism. Substantially, the doctrine was shaped along the lines of a Bud-
dhist moral economy as propagated by foreign and indigenous eco-Buddhist movements, 
schools of thought, and lay and ordained intellectuals (Rossi, 2012, forthcoming). The Suf-
ficiency Economy model was even declared to be a key tool for the social development 
of Thai society by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2007). In 2007, the 
Ministerial Office of Environmental Quality Promotion even adopted the slogan: Yut lok roon, 
chai settakit po piang (Stop global warming, use Sufficiency Economy), stressing the posi-
tive environmental impact of the King’s economic philosophy on a global scale. 
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During the decade 2000-2010, the King’s economic philosophy became the national 
brand of sustainable development and His Majesty’s teachings are recalled all over 
the country through slogans on posters, stickers, TV, and radio advertisements and 
are explained in websites, video clips, and short films that publicise the King’s mes-
sage. This regime of representation is nurtured with a visual imaginary centred on 
the presentation of didactic pictures and movies reproducing Thai villages in a ro-
manticised and static perfection. This imagery represents the ideal rural order as it 
is imaged by the royal elite and by institutions like the Office of Royal Development 
Projects and other foundations set up by members of the royal family. 
From the end of the 1990s onward, Sufficiency Economy has become the main 
mythomoteur of Royal Projects and other royal developmental initiatives. It has also 
become a key ideological framework for the activities of many NGOs and public in-
stitutions engaged in land and forest issues. Two new Royal Projects show how Suf-
ficiency Economy is used as a development paradigm in Nan: the Phu Payak-Project 
initiated by the Queen in 2005 and a new huge Royal Project initiated in 2009, called 
Phid Thong Lang Phra (PTLP).
The idea underpinning these two (and many other similar) projects is to create 
pilot areas in which farmers can learn new models of natural resource management 
and take inspiration from the King’s Sufficiency Economy idea. The activities pro-
moted in the Queen’s project and PTLP are: 1) conversion of shifting monocrop culti-
vations (rice and maize) into sedentary multicrops (including fruits, vegetables, tea, 
and flowers); 2) substitution of agro-chemical stocks of fertilisers, pesticides, and 
seeds with biological stocks; 3) reforestation programmes; 4) terracing and planting 
vetiver stripes (to reduce the space for agriculture, to prevent soil erosion, and to 
pursue forest re-growth); 5) introduction of water management techniques to avoid 
floods and droughts; 6) collection, transformation, packaging, and commercialisa-
tion of agricultural products; and 7) tourist promotion of the pilot area.
Phu Payak Royal Project
In Nan province, one of the best known and publicised Royal Projects is the one 
promoted at the border with Laos in Ban Nam Ri (Khun Nan sub-district, Chaloerm 
Phrakiet district) by Queen Sirikit, the King’s wife. The project has been baptised ‘Sta-
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tion for Agricultural Development according to the Royal Vision’ (Sathanti Patthana 
Kasettakon Phrarachadamri). Phu Payak used to be one of the hottest battlefields in 
Nan province during the communist insurgency and the project is targeted towards 
chao khao communities who were resettled by the army during that time. The project 
seeks to provide technical advice and material support to local families through the 
mediation of technicians employed in research foundations and think tanks spon-
sored by the monarchy. Local people from four villages around the core village of 
Ban Nam Ri are hired to work within the project pilot area for a salary of about THB 
100 (a little more than EUR 2) per day. In Nan town there is an elegant shop set up 
to publicise the Queen’s project to Thai tourists and to sell the project’s agricultural 
products which are neatly packaged and branded with the Royal Project logo. In the 
shop one can find the official brochure that explains the idea behind the project:
On the 12th of July 2005, Her Majesty the Queen travelled and posed her sight on the forested area around 
Phu Payak where serious problems with illegal cultivation [buk ruk] in the forest reserve still exist. . . . 
Bun Tap Samuh, general of the Thai Army3, has been entrusted with the mission to develop – respecting 
the local people – a programme to solve the problems of water management following the royal inspira-
tion. This aims to help the local people and to improve their livelihoods. . . . The [target] population is 
composed of Thai people of the mountains [chao Thai phukhao]. Their prevalent occupation consists in 
shifting agriculture [luean loi], which is causing the progressive illegal occupation of the reserve [buk 
ruk] and forest destruction on the slopes. For these reasons soil erosion problems have occurred, with 
a globally bad impact on the local eco-systems. In this way the agricultural production has diminished. 
People have become poor and the quality of life is very low. (Thai in the original, translation by author)
The brochure exemplifies a recurrent rhetoric underpinning Royal Projects in the Nan 
area. Ethnic prejudice and political oblivion drive the mainstream discourse of the ‘de-
velopers’. Information about Lua is reduced to the fact that these ‘unlucky’ Thai citi-
zens are the authors of their own miserable condition and that fortunately, the royal 
family and the army will help them to adjust their ecological habitus. Its depiction of 
the Lua follows the ethnic scapegoating as environmental ‘villains’ encroaching on the 
forest otherwise applied to the Hmong (Forsyth & Walker, 2008, p. 77).
According to the experts involved in the management of these projects that I in-
terviewed in September 2008 and in November 2009, the landscape forged by shifting 
agriculture is lambak (difficult), mai suaei (ugly), and mai tuk (wrong). Lua are com-
monly defined by the developers as very slow in accepting the importance of trees 
3   This general of the Thai Army is the most influential advisor of the Queen and for several years led the army 
operations against the Muslim separatist insurgence in Southern Thailand.
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and forests and adopting the Thai concepts of development in their life. In Nan, the 
hegemonic understanding of development is influenced by eco-Buddhist narratives 
and practices. In this context, many Lua (Mon-Khmer speaking groups) on the hills 
of Nan do not practice Buddhism, but the Royal Projects staff involves them in eco-
Buddhist ceremonies like the buad paa (tree consecration, see Darlington, 1998). In 
Royal Projects it is common for them to receive training from Buddhist monks on 
natural resource management. 
Phid Thong Lang Phra (PTLP) Royal Project
The second and much larger project, the PTLP Royal Project (set up by managers of 
the Doi Tung Royal Projects of Chiang Rai and by the Chai Patthana Fundation based in 
Chiang Mai) has targeted the whole upper basin of the Nan river since 2009. Its name 
refers to a popular saying about the practice of modesty (symbolised by the act of 
sticking golden sheets on the back of Buddha statues) and consists of a highly struc-
tured environmental intervention that aims to build rice terraces, settle nomadic 
farmers, and replant the forest over a hilly area mainly populated by Lua ex-com-
munist resettled communities. The project will last at least ten years and will cover 
a sloped area of thousand hectares, the basin of the Nan river. According to Royal 
Project managers and local urban environmental activists, this broad organisational 
enterprise will repair the hydrological balance of the Nan river which is believed to 
be the main tributary of the Chao Phraya river. In the opinion of the project manag-
ers, this massive intervention will not only support the chao khao but is primarily 
aimed at protecting lowland agriculture and preventing floods and water scarcity in 
the central plain. 
The PTLP explicitly aims to involve the communist veteran network PhoRoTho, 
with the help of army officials. This operation, once again framed by the Sufficiency 
Economy discourse and imagery, encourages the cooperation of the PhoRoTho in 
mapping and managing the territory, thus helping other institutional actors in the 
management of the rich water and forest resources of the basin, damaged by shifting 
agriculture and maize plantations (Rasakun, 2009). 
According to interviews conducted with activists from different organisations, 
farmers, village leaders, and students at the early stage of the project between Sep-
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tember and October 2009, PTLP is intended to strengthen the political influence of 
the conservative forces on the ‘red’ territory of Nan. The establishment of formal 
relations between the PTLP managers and operators and the PhoRoTho was not con-
sidered a politically neutral strategy by the majority of my long-term and short-term 
informants. Firstly, the increased number of new environmental projects in the name 
of Sufficient Economy implies a consistent flow of funding directed at local villages 
and sub-district leaders that will join the project. Secondly, it will imply the physi-
cal presence of urban upper-class bureaucrats and technicians belonging to royal 
development institutions on the hills and will be monitored by the army. Thirdly, the 
project aims to incorporate the local NGO and environmental activist networks into 
socio-environmental activities promoted by the Royal Project staff. This incorpora-
tion of environmental activists within the Royal Project and Sufficiency Economy 
framework is well underway. The most important example is the Hug Muang Nan 
Foundation, an eco-Buddhist socio-environmentalist NGO founded in 1993 by the con-
servationist monk (phra nak anuraksa) Phra Khru Pithak Natakuhun, Abbot of the Wat 
Aranyawat in Nan town (Darlington, 2000; Delcore, 2000; Rossi, 2008, 2012, forthcom-
ing). Until 2005, the Hug Muang Nan Foundation network tended to be independent 
from the royal initiatives but at the time of my fieldwork it was systematically em-
braced within the new Royal Projects programmes. Royal Project staff consistently 
asked and paid for advice and collaboration by religious and lay activists of the Hug 
Muang Nan Foundation network that in some cases have been hired and earn a sal-
ary as technicians, managers, and advisors within the Royal Projects. 
Sufficiency Economy is not Sufficient – The Limits of Royal Ideology
Despite the base of the Royal Project in royalist ideology and the repeated use of Suf-
ficiency Economy philosophy imagery, the Royal Projects in Nan show discrepancies 
between the Royal Project’s self-representation and local responses to it. I argue that 
the hiding or flattening of ethnic specificity, historical identity, and public dissent 
under ecological classifications reflect a bias that leads to a muted response. This 
can be seen by weak participation in the projects, a lack of self-confidence of partici-
pants, and an almost total absence of compliance towards the project by the target 
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subjects. Hegemonic socio-environmental projects can often be misunderstood and 
resisted by the beneficiaries. In part, this is due to the hierarchical nature of projects 
that are infused with an imagery of members of the royal family helping poor farm-
ers and therefore prevent real participation. As reported by Mr. A., an ex-employee 
of Phu Fa Royal Project (a project promoted by the Princess Sirindhorn in Bo Kluea 
district), this lack of interest is connected to the weakness of participation devices 
enacted within the Phu Payak and other Royal Projects:
[The target population] doesn’t feel they are the owners of the project, but they feel that the owners of 
the project are people that they don’t know at all and who don’t give them a chance. This is a problem 
also in Phu Payak: When some budget is provided, farmers come to the project and join the activities, 
otherwise they don’t care for the project . . . Actually, we should listen to them and ask what they exactly 
need. But experts from Bangkok come to the project and tell them: “You must do this and that.” The pro-
ject provides natural seeds and fertilisers for free to local farmers, but periodically these stocks deplete 
and the project goes short of funding from ministries and donors. (Mr. A., Santisuk district, personal 
communication, April 2009)
Even if participation and improvement of local costumes are explicit and highly pub-
licised objectives, the removal of the target communities’ accurate ethnic profile and 
historical background characterises the ongoing construction of the public image of 
many Royal Projects environmental initiatives. Beneficiaries are generally defined as 
Thai citizens (chao Thai), community (chumchon), tribe (pau), or population (ratatron). 
This lack of acknowledgement of local histories and identities matches with the lack of 
a reciprocal acknowledgement among the project’s experts and the target population. 
This situation produces niches of resistance. In Phu Payak, Lua farmers hired by the 
project used to steal the empty packaging reporting the project logo to sell non-bio-
logical products grown in their own gardens (project manager in Phu Phayak, personal 
communication, September 2008). The beneficiaries of the project complained to me 
about the salary, which to them seemed too low, while other Lua villagers complained 
about the fact that the project could not cope with the water scarcity around their set-
tlement. Hills in front of the beautifully shaped pilot areas are still seasonally burned 
to make space for monocrops, while farmers who accept to be part of the project do 
this just to get monetary and material support. Only few people spontaneously adopt 
the royal model and go back to their previous habits as soon as the budget finishes.
A more fundamental discrepancy is what Walker (2008) calls the “elites’ misinterpre-
tation” of the Thai village economy, which is deeply embedded in the global market sys-
tem. Sufficiency Economy emerges in awkward opposition to the rhetoric and practice 
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of material development pursued by the Thai pro-monarchic governments during the 
Cold War. Thus, the philosophy has been embraced by bureaucratic elites in response 
to the business oriented policies sustained by an emergent class of politicians with im-
portant careers in the business sector (i.e. Thaksin) but its projection onto rural lives 
is not reciprocated by the rural subjects themselves. This contradiction between urban 
fantasies of Sufficiency Economy and the real aspirations of the rural population is 
played out within the Royal Projects. In Nan, different categories of ‘non-farmers’ are 
today working in training activities on sustainable techniques of natural resource man-
agement to improve the farmers’ situation. Most of the NGO workers and state admin-
istrators I interviewed considered Sufficiency Economy as the key solution to farmers’ 
poverty and environmental degradation produced by slash and burn agriculture. These 
non-farmers involved in community development and sustainable agriculture imple-
ment dozens of educational projects around the province to teach rural workers about 
Sufficiency Economy principles. They are often urban educated people from the mid-
dle and upper classes, including technicians and directors of the local Royal Projects, 
managers of the Office of Agriculture of Santisuk and Nan. The Royal Project managers 
I met around the province were mainly male urban professionals from notable and 
aristocratic families, often specialised in the agro-forestry sector.
When asked for an opinion on Sufficiency Economy, my informants among the farm-
ers acknowledged the good intentions of the royal philosophy and were curious about 
the alternative practices promoted within Royal Projects, but most of them had the 
impression that “Sufficiency Economy is not sufficient” to relieve their economic con-
dition. Furthermore, some farmers looked at the intervention of urban administrators 
and NGO workers for educational and developmental purposes as an alien presence 
in their villages. I noticed a class fracture between developers and those ‘to be devel-
oped’ that in some ways reflected the ‘yellow’ versus ‘red’ conflict. Farmers identified 
NGO workers and local bureaucrats as aligned with the conservative forces and some 
looked at them as people that
get money from the state to tell us what to do, while the state gives us nothing. . . . At least, Thaksin 
gave the budget directly to each village, and we knew perfectly what to do for our communities. (farmer, 
Santisuk district, personal communication, October 2009).
On a more explicitly political note, the presence of the army (Royal Thai Army, 2011) 
monitoring socio-environmental ‘good practices’ entailed in the project activities, is 
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a political fact that alone raises serious doubts about the political neutrality of royal 
socio-environmental projects in this area. Today, Nan province is recognised as a 
key bastion of the Red Shirts and was among the 15 provinces that experienced the 
enforcement of the Emergency Decree during the repression of the Red Shirts move-
ment in May 2010 (Nightwatch, 2010). The return of Red Shirt activists who experi-
enced repression by the army may serve to reinforce the scepticism towards the ‘yel-
low’ Royal Projects. The election results from 2011, in which the Thaksin party Phuea 
Thai won a resounding victory in all districts of Nan, suggest that the Royal Projects 
have not been successful in turning the ‘red’ rural landscapes ‘yellow’. 
Conclusion
The recent bout of new Royal Projects in Northern Thailand needs to be understood 
within the changing and polarised political situation and represents an attempt to 
regain hegemony over the developmental discourse in rural Thailand. Key elements 
include the combination of traditionally prejudiced depictions of ethnic minorities 
in the uplands (Forsyth & Walker, 2008) within the Sufficiency Economy doctrine of 
the King, with an active developing role ascribed to state bureaucrats and the army. 
The biggest Royal Project to be introduced in Nan province was the PTLP pro-
gramme. If Phu Payak exemplifies the ‘old trend’ of controlling minorities by flatten-
ing ethnic and political identities under an ecological stigma (represented by slash 
and burn agriculture), PTLP combines this with the systematic attempt at incorporat-
ing civil society networks. In particular, the managers of the project try to do this by 
mobilising local networks of former communist comrades (and thus many Lua) and 
by including the eco-Buddhist socio-environmentalist network Hug Muang Nan Foun-
dation. PTLP thus opens new trends in implementation strategies of Royal Projects. 
The PTLP project represents a large-scale strategy to win over rural populations in 
‘red’ areas, proved by the fact of the intended implementation of PTLP programmes 
in Yala and Udon provinces respectively. Yala is perceived as the core of the Muslim 
contemporary insurgency in the South, and Udon is considered the strongest ‘from 
red to red’ province in the northeast of Thailand (Isan). Like these provinces, Nan 
occupies a delicate position in the national political landscape and the co-optation 
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strategy triggered by PTLP – which today involves the whole civil society, both in ur-
ban and in rural milieus – is aimed at countering a stronghold of former communist 
resistance with many members of the Red Shirt PhoRoTho.
The new socio-environmental Royal Projects in Nan are far from being politically 
neutral. Behind a frame that emphasises ecologically sound approaches and the sus-
tainable improvement of rural livelihoods, the proliferation of Royal Projects around 
the upper Nan river basin in the decade 2000-2010 is an attempt to enforce the pres-
ence of conservative networks in a region that strongly supports the Red Shirts and 
the radical wing of the reformist movement. The strategy implies both de-politi-
cisation and co-optation of local communities and networks. In this scenario, the 
environmental spectacle carried on within Royal Projects in Nan not only offers new 
solutions to natural resources management in areas afflicted by shifting agriculture 
but works as an inclusive and soft strategy of conservative rule. However, after the 
violent repression of the Red Shirts in Bangkok and their re-emergence as a powerful 
force after the 2011 election victory, it seems unlikely that the Royal Projects will be 
sufficient to reshape the ‘wrong’ and ‘red’ landscapes handcrafted by the chao khao 
Lua and to re-colour them ‘yellow’. 
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